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Abstract
This paper examines the prospects and limits of policies towards information and communications
technologies (ICTs). The co-evolution of technological, economic, and political factors that has af-
fected the information network infrastructure during the past three decades has transformed it from
a relatively closed to more open system. As a consequence, the degree of complexity of the ICT in-
frastructure has increased with far-reaching implications for its governance. Paradoxically, policy
was better able to control important performance characteristics, such as prices or investment lev-
els, during the past monopoly era. However, the ability to control came at the high price of the in-
efficiencies associated with monopoly organization. In the present more competitive framework,
many feasible policy instruments only work indirectly. Sector performance is an emergent property
resulting from decentralized decisions in markets. It is influenced but not fully determined by pol-
icy choices. These changes need to be recognized more explicitly in the theoretical foundations, the
formation and the implementation of policy. Applying concepts from the theory of complex evolv-
ing systems, the paper develops lessons for the design of effective information and communications
policy.
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1  Introduction
This paper examines the prospects and limits of policies intended to govern the networks and tech-
nologies that enable knowledge-based societies. The past decades of restructuring have increased the
performance of the information and communication infrastructure and contributed to the proliferation
and nearly ubiquitous availability of networks. However, open access conditions have also increased
the volatility of the sector. Disruptive technologies, such as WiFi or IP telephony, while promising
significant innovations create additional challenges. The main thesis of the paper is that the co-evolution
of technological, economic, and political factors, which unfolded during the past two to three dec-
ades, has transformed the network infrastructure from a closed to an open system. This has far-reach-
ing implications for the control and governance of the sector. In the closed system, policy had tools
available that could – at least in principle – achieve certain desired outcomes. In the present open
system, policy instruments are typically confined to more limited aspects of the sector. Thus policy,
while not irrelevant, may not be able to steer the performance or the evolution of the sector effectively.
Recent developments such as the glacial emergence of local competition or the meltdown of tele-
communication stocks in 2000 can serve as examples of limitations of governance.1 This observa-
tion has led some authors and policy-makers to the conclusion that any attempt to govern is in vein
and would only deteriorate performance. As expressed by John Barry Parlow (1996), cyberliber-
tarians had for some time claimed that advanced networks could and should not be subject to any
form of government oversight. With a like strong dose of ideological conviction, pundits such as
George Gilder (2000) or Peter Huber (1997) argued that laissez faire and an application of case
law would be sufficient to govern the “telecosm”. In contrast, William Melody (2003) identified
four areas in which Internet governance could yield benefits although he is somewhat skeptic as to
whether the appropriate institutions and instruments can be developed. Along similar lines, the re-
cent World Summit on the Information Society expressed the hope that effective governance struc-
tures could help harnessing the benefits of the Internet (WSIS 2003). Patricia Longstaff (2003)
analyzed the features of information and communication technology (ICT) and highlighted the fun-
damental challenges of regulating such a complex system. The question of whether advanced com-
munications networks can be governed effectively – and, if so, with what means – is of utmost im-
portance and is at the heart of this paper.
ICT regulation is based on a set of practical skills that are rooted in a much broader epistemic
knowledge base (for a general discussion see Mokyr 2002). One of the findings of this paper is that
the new environment of information industries may require a revision of part of the practical skills
that form the basis of the present regulatory and policy model. Using the existing framework, there
is a risk that unrealistic expectations as to the ability of policy to steer the information and commu-
nications system are created. Unexpected effects of public policy and private action are conven-
iently treated as aberrations rather than the results of more fundamental structural change and the
limitations of controlling large-scale systems. At the same time, opportunities for sustainable forms
of governance may not be recognized. Exploring these themes, the next section of the paper pro-
vides a short overview of the co-evolution of technology, policy, and the economic characteristics
of the information and communication industries. Section three discusses at a general level the
prospects and limits of governing complex adaptive systems such as next generation networks.
Section four revisits the prospects and limits of regulation using several recent cases. The final
section reviews lessons for research and public policy.
1 “Governance” can be broadly defined as “the making of decisions that affect others in important ways” (Samuels
2002). This includes government, the corporate systems, non-governmental organizations, and international
organizations. The present paper focuses on government action although the arguments can be extended to
other modes of governance, such as co-regulation and self-regulation. These modes can help mitigate some of the
information and political feasibility issues discussed below but not necessarily the problems related to complexity.
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2 The co-evolution of policy,
technology and sector economics
Telecommunication regulation is commonly conceptualized as a response to the technological and
economic characteristics of communications technology. According to this view, public policy is
seen as a correction of market failure or – and this is much more contested – as a correction of un-
desirable market outcomes. Thus, given the cost structure and demand conditions of the industry,
public policy should protect consumers and competitors against an abuse of market power and sup-
port additional goals such as universal service. This perspective overlooks that regulation in turn
influences the investment and innovation decisions of the regulated as well as unregulated firms
and hence market structure, technology deployment and the economics of the industry. If several
technological options are available, firms will choose solutions that are compatible with the pre-
vailing or expected legal and regulatory environment. Firms operating under monopoly conditions
will deploy technologies with high economies of scale and scope, in thereby reinforcing “natural”
monopoly characteristics of the sector. Firms operating under competitive conditions will choose
solutions with less significant sunk cost, resulting in a different technological path. While regula-
tion initially may have been a response to the prevailing industry structure, at later points industry
structure is also an outcome of the prevailing regulatory model. The relation between industry struc-
ture and regulation is therefore recursive: regulation and industry structure co-evolve, each shaping
and being shaped by the other.
The recent transformation of information and communication infrastructure is well documented and
does not need to be recapitulated in detail. The World Telecommunications Development Reports
by the International Telecommunication Union (most recent ITU 2003), the biannual Communica-
tions Outlooks by the OECD (most recent OECD 2003) and reports by the World Bank provide
rich institutional and empirical detail. More analytically focused treatments are Brock (1994, 2003)
and Trebing (1994) for the United States, Mansell and Steinmueller (2000) or Natalicchi (2001)
for the European Union, and Fransman (2002) or Madden (2003) at an international level. Within a
period of several decades, beginning as early as the 1960s in the United States, the previous mo-
nopoly framework was replaced by an approach with a much stronger emphasis on competition. It
is often overlooked that in most countries the traditional monopoly framework had also emerged
over an extended period of time in a struggle between political and economic forces in favor of
private ownership and competition and those in favor of government control (Bauer 2004, Schneider
2001). From this struggle a pragmatic guiding vision emerged that was built around three corner-
stones. Telecommunications became viewed as a natural monopoly; it was accepted that the sector
had strong public interest implications; and there was agreement that the state could and should
improve the functioning of the sector compared to unregulated market outcomes.
The new sector model is likewise based on a pragmatic consensus. Recognizing technological and
economic forces that had seemingly reduced the economies of scale in the sector, the vision was
accepted that it could and should be organized in a competitive way. Where market power and
even naturally monopolistic market segments prevail, they could be neutralized through innovative
policies such as price caps, mandatory interconnection, unbundling, and antitrust enforcement. Goals
that would not be realized in competitive markets (sometime lumped together under the nondescript
term “non-market” goals), should be achieved with market-compatible and competitively neutral
instruments. Whereas in the old vision state intervention was ideally seen as a substitute for com-
petition, in the new vision it was modeled as a precondition and complement to competition. It is
difficult to disentangle the effect of the policy transformation from other changes in the sector,
such as the effects of “Moore’s Law” and “Metcalfe’s Law.” As a result there is a temptation to at-
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tribute any change in sector performance to policy reform, an approach that likely overestimates its
contribution (Henten and Schneider 2003, Crandall and Waverman 1995).2 Nevertheless, the more
open market organization has gone hand in hand with a new sector dynamic, improvements in sec-
tor performance, and a wave of innovations in terms of services and pricing.
Most analyses of these transitions identify technological change and new user needs as the main
drivers of policy responses and pay relatively little attention to other factors, such as the funda-
mental reorientation of public policy or global interest policies. Fewer studies recognize the inter-
related nature of these changes and recognize that policy, technology and economics co-evolve
(e.g., Trebing 1994, Dutton 1999, Mansell and Steinmueller 2000, and Fransman 2002). A com-
parison between the United States and the European Union (as well as between individual states in
the United States and member states within the European Union) reveals patterns that illustrate the
multiple contingencies between policy, technology, and economics. The new sector organization has
similar general features in both regions, such as a separation of regulation and operational functions,
a strong trust in competition, or interconnection and unbundling rules (Schneider 2001). Neverthe-
less, the mutual interdependence between political-institutional, economic, and technological fac-
tors shaped the path of the overall transformation and the details of the new approaches. Thus, within
the new framework dissimilarities in the details of the legal and regulatory arrangements continue
to exist. For example, the more porous legal and regulatory system in the U.S. allowed more grad-
ual responses to changes in the overall system. Federal and state regulation responded to new in-
formation technologies and needs earlier than in any other nation but proceeded at a more moder-
ate pace. In countries with a more centralized political system such as the EU and its member
states, change emerged much later but often evolved faster, reflecting the higher ability of policy-
makers to effectively transform industry structure. For example, Cherry and Bauer (2002) demon-
strate this phenomenon in the case of rate rebalancing. Moreover, the process exhibits a strong de-
gree of path dependence. For example, while the break-up of AT&T in the U.S. facilitated the crea-
tion of competition in the long distance market, it greatly complicated the re-integration of the in-
dustry after it had become evident that the traditional geographic delineation into long distance and
local markets made increasingly less sense. European countries had not split local and long distance
services in a comparable way and thus did not have to confront this specific problem and the asso-
ciated complicated regulatory issues.
One of the secrets of success of the new, more open legal and regulatory framework is its facilita-
tion of entrepreneurship. It has allowed technological innovations to be deployed in the network,
which have gradually transformed – and will continue to transform – its traditional architecture. The
most important developments are the near-ubiquitous diffusion of digital technology, tremendous
increases in the transmission capacity of networks (including, albeit slower, broadband local access
networks), and the continued rapid increases in processor power that have transformed wireline
and wireless communications alike. The Internet, best characterized as a logical platform residing
on a patchwork of physical networks (inter alia, narrowband voice, cable television, and wireless
networks), epitomizes the architecture of next generation networks (NGNs) (Elixmann and Schim-
mel 2003). More than the present networks, NGNs will constitute general-purpose technologies,
platforms upon which applications and services can be configured. Depending on the overall net-
work configuration, in this emerging environment, the physical network layer may become fully
independent of the upper application and services layers. As a result, the historical ability of plat-
form service providers to earn rents by tying services to their physical network platforms will be
severely weakened (Clark 2001). Furthermore, a general-purpose network platform will also facili-
2 Noam (2001) points out that substantial improvements were also achieved in countries that did not imple-
ment the new blueprint.
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tate the adoption of disruptive technologies such as WiFi or VoIP.3 Should such an open network
emerge, the ability of content providers to earn profits may also be weakened, especially in the
presence of disruptive (if illegal) peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies.
These developments toward commodity markets for platform services and at least some forms of
content conflict with the fundamental economic characteristics of the information and communica-
tion industries (Shy 2001, Gottinger 2003, Noam 2004). Most importantly, these industries are char-
acterized by high fixed and low incremental cost. In a competitive environment, prices will con-
verge to incremental costs and likely be below average costs, undermining sustainable business
models. Many segments of the information and communications industries also exhibit network ef-
fects, that is, the benefits for a participant in the network are dependent on the overall size of the
network (Liebowitz and Margolis 2002). Network effects can facilitate the growth of service pro-
viders but they may also work the other way and accelerate the shrinking of a supplier or a sector.
In the new environment, the interdependence between industry segments is higher and develop-
ments in one market segment may have spillover effects on others. Overall, these features contrib-
ute to an increased structural volatility in the information services industries. Noam (2004) points
out that this precariousness may destabilize not only the information sector but, due to multiplier
effects, the entire information-based economy. To avoid the perils of operation in a commodity
market, firms may attempt to merge and/or to strategically abuse remaining bottlenecks, especially
in access networks. Moreover, they may have strong incentives to erect new “logical” bottlenecks,
for example, by using proprietary protocols on their networks or by blocking access to certain
Internet addresses and the related content, as is already the case in the United States’ broadband
cable access market.
The remarkable transition from a monopolistic framework to the present and emerging open envi-
ronment has fundamentally altered industry dynamics and the prospects for regulation. The old
framework allowed sector planning in pursuit of important infrastructure goals.4 By reducing un-
certainty and stabilizing expectations, it provided a market environment that facilitated long-term
infrastructure investment at lower profit rates. In contrast, the new environment is more risky and –
other things equal – requires higher profitability to elicit similar long-term infrastructure invest-
ment. This is not necessarily a disadvantage as the economic and technological life span of the
components of the new networks is much shorter than previously and the network has a much
higher degree of modularity and scalability. Both the old and the new information and communica-
tions industries can be described as large technical systems (Mayntz and Hughes 1988). Such sys-
tems may show varying degrees of complexity (see below section 3 for a more detailed discussion).
A closed monopolistic system like traditional infrastructure industries typically has a low degree of
complexity but a more open system will have a higher degree of complexity. Even though monopo-
listic large technical systems raise challenging control issues, in the historical monopoly environ-
ment it was easier to identify policy instruments that could achieve desired outcomes. In the new
environment, the degree of complexity of information and communications industries has increased,
rendering it more complicated to identify policy instruments.
Some common features characterize complex adaptive systems, all of which are present in the pre-
sent information and communication sectors. Many agents involved in decentralized decision-making
populate them. These agents have dispersed, differing, and localized knowledge (and hence incom-
plete knowledge of the entire system). Their actions in response to the perceived environment are
often based on routines shaped by past experience. Furthermore, they differ with regard to their
ability to learn and adapt to changing circumstances (Holland 1995). Decisions by these agents are
interrelated, contributing to a degree of coupling between the components of the system. Such cou-
3 “Disruptive” is meant in an economic, Schumpeterian sense, implying that the new technology poses severe
challenges to established organizations and institutions.
4 This does not necessarily imply that the chosen instruments were efficient.
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pling can be on a continuum between loose or tight, in which case actions in one subsystem strongly
affect another (Longstaff 2003). Coupling can exist in vertical (upstream-downstream) or in hori-
zontal relations. For example, digitization has multiplied the substitutability relations between net-
work service providers. Thus a decision mandating the unbundling of DSL broadband access plat-
forms will have repercussions for broadband access providers in the cable market, for potential
new market entrants and for content providers that may not be fully anticipated. However, under
certain conditions, complex adaptive systems are self-organizing and the new policy model is prin-
cipally designed to take advantage of this feature, mostly by promoting competition. Complex
adaptive systems can be represented as layered systems, with individual decision-makers forming
the lowest tier, organizations, markets, and sectors forming intermediate tiers, and the economy as
a whole forming the highest layer. One of the fundamental insights into the operation of complex
adaptive systems is that performance at higher tiers is an emergent property that cannot be traced
back to decisions at a lower level analytically, greatly complicating the identification of effective
policy instruments. Thus, the question arises, as to how this transition toward a system of higher
adaptive complexity has affected the prospects and limits of regulating and governing the informa-
tion infrastructure. This question is addressed in the next section.
3 Prospects and limits of
governance of complex adaptive systems
Some economic schools, such as the American institutional tradition, which was very influential in
shaping regulation until the 1970s, or some members of the German Gemeinwirtschaftslehre, which
was similarly influential shaping the public enterprise system in several European countries, saw
the task of government in the transformation of capitalism. However, the dominant view of regula-
tion saw it as a means to overcome weaknesses of the market. At least in market-based economies
regulatory policy was therefore conceptualized as a means of correcting forms of market failure
and of undesirable outcomes of unregulated markets. Classical scenarios for intervention were seen
in the prevalence of natural monopolies (wired telecommunications), the absence of property rights
(radio communications), as well as public and merit good characteristics (universal service, content
regulation). A division of labor was accepted between policy-makers (who were to decide policy
goals) and researchers (who were to identify the most efficient means of achieving the goals). Sim-
plified models allowing the identification and calibration of policy instruments were developed for
this purpose. Once the most effective means and their dosage were known, policy was an exercise
in social engineering. Although this view prevailed in practice, its fundamental assumptions of a
benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent policy-maker were soon subject to increasing criticism
(Dixit 1996). This lively discussion has revealed that policy is subject to multiple, interrelated con-
ditions, which can be categorized into information, institutional, and systemic constraints. Before
these issues are reviewed, it is necessary to briefly discuss the conditions of successful policy.
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3.1 Conditions of successful policy
A policy instrument is effective if it is sufficient to cause a desired or prevent an undesired effect.
Sufficiency implies that whenever the instrument is present a certain effect is also observable. This
notion is expressed well in the frameworks for government policy as formalized by Tinbergen
(1952) and Theil (1964) and summarized by Johansen (1977). Following the notation of Eggerts-
son (1998), a policy-decision has four aspects. Societal preferences are expressed in an objective
function
W = W(x) (1)
A policy model specifies empirical relations between policy variables a, which are part of a larger
set of policy variables A (a∈A), outcomes x and external variables z.
x = f(a, z) (2)
Moreover, analytical or computational methods are needed to determine policy instruments that
maximize the objective function W(x). If Xz is the set of possible outcomes given the external fac-
tors z, the goal of public policy is to find policy variables a*, generating outcomes x*
a* = g(x*, z) (3)
that maximize the objective function W* = W(x*). This is most evident in the case of macroeco-
nomic policy but applies in analogy to regulatory policies designed at the level of individual firms
or sectors. Policy instruments a* need to be sufficient to achieve x*. The underlying models are es-
sentially mechanic and deterministic (Morçöl 2002). Moreover, the traditional view holds that W is
determined by policy makers, whereas experts reveal the relevant theoretical and empirical rela-
tions f(a, z) and assist in the choice of the optimal policy instrument.
In practice, many available policy instruments are not sufficient but only necessary conditions for a
desired outcome. Necessity means that a factor can be observed whenever an effect is present but
that it can also have other effects. Policy will be effective if an instrument is both necessary and
sufficient for an outcome. The design of effective policy is complicated if multiple necessary con-
ditions need to be fulfilled simultaneously. Policy faces the risk of failure if not all of the necessary
conditions or not all components of a constellation of sufficient factors can be influenced. Further-
more, theoretical and empirical research have demonstrated that causation in social systems is often
complex (Ragin 2000). This means that it is relatively rare to find one sufficient instrument for a
desired outcome. However, a specific outcome may be the result of one or even multiple constella-
tions of factors that, taken alone, may be neither sufficient nor necessary.
3.2 Information constraints
Beginning as early as the 1920s, the exploration of information constraints of economic activity has
contributed to a broad re-thinking of public policy. Work in this area led to an abandonment of the as-
sumption of an omniscient policy-maker and brought several important issues to the fore. The discus-
sion, mainly conducted by economists and later cognitive scientists, addressed issues of decision-mak-
ing under uncertainty, problems of asymmetric information, and the feasibility of planning and public
policy in general. Given space constraints, this paper will not discuss the first line of argument in de-
tail. Starting with Knight (1921) economists started to pay more explicit attention to the effects of un-
certainty on decision-making and to develop criteria appropriate for these conditions. Both policy
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analysis and management science have adopted the emerging principles (see Morgan and Henrion 1990
for an overview) but, so far, they are rarely used in information and communications policy-making.5
A second line of inquiry studied the problems raised by asymmetrically distributed information, the
fact that knowledge is local and not fully shared among the participants in the economy and in the
regulatory process in particular. Policy-makers (“principals”) are at a loss compared to “agents”
who may have more pertinent information. Public policy-making typically can be described as mul-
tiple principal agent relations, for example, between voters and legislators, legislators and regula-
tors, regulators and managers, and managers and employees, each level afflicted with problems of
asymmetric information. Under the headings of information economics and contract theory research-
ers have studied how individual and collective decisions are made under such conditions (Stiglitz
1986, Laffont and Tirole 1993, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001, Laffont and Martimort
2002). This literature contributed to the development of “incentive compatible” regulatory mecha-
nisms that mitigate or overcome the information deficits of the regulatory agency compared to the
regulated firm (Sappington and Weisman 1996). It does not question whether policy can succeed
but rather points out that under real-world conditions efficient policy often will require the use of
complicated instruments (Laffont and Tirole 2000). For practical regulatory purposes less demand-
ing, simplified forms of incentive regulation, such as price caps, were “derived” from this concep-
tual literature.
A third debate focused on the more fundamental question as to whether a centralized planner could
succeed in steering the economy. The early discussion explored whether a centrally planned econ-
omy could solve the economic problem efficiently. Later the emphasis shifted to the question of
whether planning could improve the working of a market economy. In the context of these disputes,
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. v. Hayek argued that a centralized economy would not be able
to collect and process the enormous amount of information necessary to develop an efficient plan.
In his view, it was the great advantage of a decentralized market organization to process localized
knowledge in superior ways. Competition could be seen as a “discovery procedure” assisting indi-
vidual agents to adjust their plans to the actions of others. The resulting “spontaneous order” would
be superior to any planning attempts (Hayek 1944, Caldwell 2004). Hayek must not be read as en-
dorsing total laissez-faire, but he is not specific as to where the boundary between free market ac-
tivity and policy should be drawn (see the review of his Road to Serfdom by John Maynard Keynes
cited in Skidelsky (2000), p. 285; see also Samuels 2002). As a consequence, the proponents of an
extreme libertarian agenda often take his writings to support their own political agenda. Neverthe-
less, he highlights the importance of decentralized information processing and the difficulty of a
central planner to overcome the inherent ignorance.
Whereas Hayek concluded that public policy could not reach superior outcomes due to structural
information deficits of the planner, Lucas (1987), in a celebrated model, claimed that government
actions were ineffective because they were anticipated and thus neutralized by individual decision-
makers. As will become transparent in the remainder of the paper, Lucas does not distinguish be-
tween process policy and policies aiming at the legal and institutional framework (the “order”) in
which decentralized decisions unfold. If individuals indeed have rational expectations, process
policy will lose effectiveness, unless it is random. However, the overall regulatory framework of a
sector or the economy as a whole becomes effective exactly by being incorporated into individual
decision-making.
5 The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recently renamed its Office of Plans and Policy
(OPP) to Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP) with the mission to engage in such broader
research efforts.
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Lastly, cognitive psychology demonstrated that large parts of our knowledge of the world are con-
structed in the interaction of the human mind with the signals received from its environment (Riz-
zello 1999). Knowledge generation is a self-referential process as the accumulated stock shapes the
creation of incremental knowledge. Whereas the knowledge base can be expanded at a cost, it nev-
ertheless remains incomplete. Cognitive psychologists have also found that humans face processing
constraints. Due to the opportunity costs of information processing, not all possible options are re-
viewed. Rather, as Herbert A. Simon (1982) explained, individuals search until an internal thresh-
old is satisfied. This threshold is not fixed but is modified in response to the experience of indi-
viduals. As a result, human action is based on simplified models of a problem. Many decisions, in-
cluding policy-decisions, are made based on routines rather than fully rational searches for the best
alternative. For this reason, decisions based on a wrong model can persist for a long time (Denzau
and North 1994). An example from the recent ICT policy debate may be the assumption that local
competition is feasible, upon which regulatory policy is predicated. This may be a misleading prem-
ise although it might be very difficult to find out (see Cas 2003 for a recent critique). Recognizing
this impossibility of knowing the “truth” Karl Popper proposed a process of piecemeal engineering
as the most successful approach to public policy. Likewise, Williamson (2000) has proposed a “re-
mediability” criterion, according to which a state can only be deemed inefficient if a more efficient
alternative can be identified and if a path to this state exists.
A common theme emerging from these diverse strands of work is that, despite elaborate general
equilibrium models of optimal policy design, regulatory policy is necessarily a dynamic trial and
error process. Not all countries have the resources to go through a similar trial and error process as
the pioneer nations (United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and so forth). Thus, the regulatory model
adopted by these first movers has become a strong blueprint for others and is imitated and emu-
lated by many others (Schneider 2001, Henisz, Zelner and Guillén 2004). The next section discusses
institutional and other feasibility constraints that need to be met by information and communication
policy.
3.3 Institutional constraints
Whereas information issues have questioned the omniscience of policy-makers, the burgeoning lit-
erature on institutional and political dimensions of policy-making has cast a more differentiated light
on the view of government as a benevolent and omnipotent actor. Public policies are enabled and
constrained by the specific legal, institutional, socio-cultural and historical framework of a society.
The pertinent literature uses the term “institution” in three different ways, referring to (a) the rules
of the game (North 1990); (b) organizations (Nelson 1994); or equilibrium expectations resulting
from repeated interaction among the players of a game (Aoki 2001). North’s approach is intuitively
compelling whereas Aoki’s formulation is theoretically more versatile. “Rule-of-the-game” theo-
rists typically subscribe to the view that institutions are designed (although they do not offer de-
tailed explanations as to how binding institutions emerge). Equilibrium theorists view institutions
as emerging phenomena. In practice, institutions are both emergent (“spontaneous” in Hayek’s lan-
guage) and designed (Samuels 2002). Each society can be described by a unique “stock” of formal
and informal institutions.6 Formal institutions include the legal system (e.g., constitutional, statutory
and case law) and the political set-up of a polity (e.g., the division of powers). Informal institutions
include values, beliefs, customs and norms shared by the members of a society.
6 Levy and Spiller (1996) have termed this stock “institutional endowment”.
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Except in periods of rapid transition or revolution, institutions evolve gradually and can be changed
by expending time and effort (Brock 1994). To this end, institutional frameworks specify meta-rules
that govern the process of formal institutional change (e.g., rules for amending the constitution).
Therefore, at every given point in time the institutional endowment of a society reflects earlier pe-
riods, creating some form of path dependence. Regulation is embedded into this broader framework
and needs to obey the constraints imposed by institutions, such as due process, the division of labor
between federal and state jurisdiction or the role of courts exercising their power of judicial review.
As a result, not all theoretically possible policy options are also feasible. For example, in the United
States federal policy proposals are often challenged by the states and overturned in court, clearly
limiting the set of feasible policies.
The political system of a nation is a particular component of its institutional setup. This is a rich
topic in itself and cannot receive detailed treatment in the present paper although a few important
points deserve mentioning. Legislative or regulatory change happens in a political process. The po-
litical setup, as expressed in formal constitutions and statutes as well as in informal power struc-
tures shapes policy outcomes. Legal measures can only be adopted if the required simple or quali-
fied majorities are assembled. To reach such majorities, players often need to accept compromises,
contributing to legislation far apart from an unconstrained “optimal” policy. Tsebelis (2002) has
tried to capture the political diversity of national regimes in his veto-player model. According to
this approach, the number of veto players crucially determines the path of legal transformation. The
model allows capturing the most pertinent dimensions of the political process although its explana-
tory power collapses for information and communications reform once other political variables are
introduced (Bauer, Häge and Schneider 2004). Other models as to the working of the political pro-
cess were proposed by Lindblom (1968), March and Olson (1989) and Kingdon (1995). All these
models emphasize the multiple contingencies of practical policy making.
For example, Lindblom argued that policy decisions are made by “proximate policymakers” (leg-
islators, political executives, appointed bureaucrats, perhaps party officials). As they are highly
specialized, there typically are only small groups that are able to focus their attention on specific
policy areas. They operate within institutional structures and rules of the game, including the provi-
sions of relevant constitutions, legislative acts, administrative rulings, executive orders, and judicial
decisions. March and Olson analyzed processes of learning in political settings, emphasizing the
role of networks of experts and peers, and the conditions for policy change to be incremental or
non-incremental. Kingdon pointed out that in order to succeed with a specific reform proposal,
three “streams” of events, a problem stream, a policy stream and a political stream need to be syn-
chronized. As the number of political actors grows, it may become more difficult to adopt policies
other than marginal changes from the status quo. Thus, in the current environment of information
and communication industries, successful policy change may become less likely.
The institutional framework of a nation often contains provisions preventing policy change that af-
fects the economic rights of stakeholders. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion bars the government from taking private property without just compensation. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has found that private profits are a derivative of private property, placing boundaries
on the government’s power to regulate. Abrupt legal or regulatory change runs the risk of violating
these provisions (Sidak and Spulber 1997). To survive constitutional challenge, policies thus need
to be compatible with established legal provisions, for example, the rights and obligations of com-
mon carriers (Cherry 2003). This places an important economic sustainability constraint on possi-
ble reforms.
Lastly, there is also a long tradition of economists and political scientists studying the behavior of
the government – and regulatory agencies in particular – under conditions of asymmetric informa-
tion. One school of thought is tied to the University of Chicago and includes the work of Stigler
(1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983). Models in this tradition show that self-interested regu-
lators will more likely adopt measures that benefit articulate small groups at the expense of the
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general public. In contrast to this “capture” theory of regulation, the Virginia school of scholars
around James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argues that the presence of government will inevita-
bly lead to inefficient and wasteful rent-seeking behavior. Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980)
and their followers therefore emphasize the importance of constitutional rules to limit such unde-
sirable behavior.
Like problems of incomplete information, institutional conditions therefore create deviations from
unconstrained optimization, often rendering second and third-best options as the only feasible choices.
Moreover, they may contribute to considerable inefficiencies and waste of resources.
3.4 System complexity
In a predecessor to more recent developments, Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), in their theory of the
second-best, pointed out that in an interdependent system market failure could not be corrected with
targeted interventions, as was, for example, the rationale for price regulation for telephone service.
Rather adjustments were required in all related markets, rendering efficient policy very complicated
to achieve. During the past three decades, researchers in multiple disciplines have directed their
attention toward the study of technological artefacts and their controllability. These approaches
have in common an emphasis on the crucial fact that economic, legal, political and socio-cultural
conditions interact in a systemic fashion. Systemic constraints on regulation arise from three sources:
(a) the necessity to find solutions that are simultaneously compatible with the economic, political,
legal and other forces; (b) the complexity of the regulated industry and society at large; and (c) fac-
tors that are not controllable by policy.
Since the 1960s, sociologists, political scientists and (a few) economists have studied the conditions
under which large technical system evolve and can be governed (Hughes 1983, Mayntz and Hughes
1988). The systems theoretic school in sociology (Luhmann 1994) introduced tools that can be used
to analyze such more complex forms of interaction. A systems view was also adopted by research
on complex adaptive systems (Waldrop 1992), which will be discussed in more detail below. The
most applied research in this vein emerged from work on the governance and control of large tech-
nical systems (Hughes 1983, Mayntz and Hughes 1988, Schneider 2001). According to Luhmann
(1994) modern societies are characterized by the functional differentiation of activities. The econ-
omy, law, science, politics, religion, education, media, and social movements are important func-
tional systems of society.7 These functional systems develop their own logic and dynamics. For ex-
ample, the function of the political system is to develop collectively binding rules; the function of
the economy is to ensure material reproduction; and the function of the legal system is to establish
order and solve conflicts. The systems are structurally coupled to form overall society and constitute
contingencies for change in any of the systems. As a result of this complex interaction, the ability
of actors in any of the functional systems to control the overall system is limited.
More recently, the theory of complex adaptive systems emerged from attempts to understand dy-
namic processes that could not be explained with the prevailing equilibrium oriented models (Ros-
ser 1999, Longstaff 2003). Systems vary in their complexity. Although the language is not fully
consistent, scholars typically differentiate three states: order, edge-of-chaos, and chaotic (Kauffman
1993, 1995). Orderly regimes can be stable or they can oscillate between two or more positions.
Whereas orderly regimes are predictable, edge-of-chaos and chaotic regimes cannot be predicted
7 Other functional areas are morality, ethics, arts, medicine, love, and the (individual) psychical system (Reese-
Schäfer 1999).
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with reasonable accuracy, although the general position of the system may be known (Morçöl 2002,
p. 156). Complex systems may undergo phase transitions: orderly systems may become chaotic, a
process studied by chaos theory. Conversely, chaotic systems can become orderly, a transition ex-
amined by self-organization theory. Complex systems often exhibit non-linear dynamic behavior.
They show a high degree of diversity and agents in the system are connected via multiple flows
over networks of nodes and connectors (Holland 1995, 1998, Colander 2000, Axelrod 1997).
Due to the multiplicity of links in complex systems, the limited ability of actors to influence the
overall conditions of the system, and the adaptation of actors to changing system conditions, effec-
tive policies are difficult or impossible to determine. As policies are rarely based on a full under-
standing of all the relevant interactions and dynamic effects, policies often have unexpected effects.
Only in rare circumstances (“leverage points”) will it be possible to define and implement effective
policies. One of these leverage points is the redesign of the legal and regulatory framework of a
sector. In most other conditions, public policy, especially discretionary measures, will only nudge
the overall system in a direction (Brock and Colander 2000), with the overall effect determined by
positive and negative feedbacks. Thus, process policy dynamically interacts with other actors in the
system. In a slightly different perspective, policies defining the legal and regulatory framework can
also be seen as defining the “fitness landscape” of players (Kauffman 1995). Thus, rather than co-
ercing efficient solutions they are better viewed as the selection environment in which competitors
struggle for survival. Thus, rules and regulations affect which firms are more likely to succeed.
Complexity theory does not necessarily provide radically new and different answers to the problem
of governance. It sensitizes analysis to recognize non-linear phenomena and the possibility or even
likelihood of unpredictable outcomes, which make it nearly impossible to determine appropriate
policy-instruments. Moreover, it highlights the importance of the overall rules within which a sec-
tor evolves. In an industry in a static equilibrium or in a steady state expansion path, the insights
from complexity theory more or less correspond with the results of network economics or advanced
industrial organization. However, if these conditions do not hold – and the information and com-
munication sector is unlikely in such an equilibrium state – it points our attention to aspects that are
overlooked by traditional theory. In sum, both the literature on the governance of large technical
system and the theory of complex adaptive systems result in relatively cautious views as to the pos-
sibility of effective control. The next section explores the consequences for ICT policy in more
detail.
14 _____________________________________________________________________ Johannes M. Bauer
manu:script (ITA-04-03) _________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
4 Implications for
selected areas of communications policy
Communications policy faces a vast array of issues and it would be presumptuous to claim that all
could be addressed and solved in a short paper. This section reviews a few selected issues using the
framework laid out in the previous sections. From these arguments follows that, due to information
and institutional constraints as well as complexity, policy and regulation need to be understood as
endogenous to the overall system in which they take place. This implies, in sharp contrast to the
dominant view of policy as an exogenous controlling force, that policy may have fewer degrees of
freedom than previously assumed. On the other hand, as history and experience illustrate, the ex-
treme position that policy has no degrees of freedom and no effect on the overall system cannot be
sustained.
4.1 Complexity and regulatory restraint
The present regulatory framework for communications infrastructure is itself the outcome of the
co-evolution described in section two of this paper. Thus, the elimination of monopoly structures
and comprehensive government control is the response to the increasing complexity of the infor-
mation and communications sector. Recent regulatory reform is predicated on the superiority of com-
petition over centralized control. It has led to a reduction in the activities subject to regulation and
has changed the mix between process-oriented policy intervention and measures affecting the over-
all framework of rights and obligations in which market forces can unfold. However, it has not nec-
essarily simplified regulation. It is a paradox of the regulatory transformation, at least in the United
States, that under the banner of liberalization certain aspects of regulation, especially unbundling,
have become more detailed and intrusive. The European Union has attempted to simplify its regu-
latory framework following the 1999 Communications Review although it may again become more
complicated in the course of implementation and possible court challenges.
Table 1 illustrates selected goals at three different levels and – under the strong assumption of ideal
policy implementation and enforcement – identifies policy instruments to achieve them. In the pre-
sent open market environment, sufficient regulatory instruments exist predominantly at the micro
(firm, individual) level. Even at this level, however, the scope of regulation has been reduced to
firms with market power. For example, less than half of the revenues of service providers are sub-
ject to some form of regulatory supervision. Although similar instruments exist in principle for the
sector level, the deregulatory philosophy of the past decades has largely abandoned them instead
trusting in competition as an organizing principle. As a consequence, the present toolkit of regula-
tors only contains means that are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve specific sector out-
comes (unless they are forthcoming by unregulated market forces). The only exception is universal
service policy, where a modicum of instruments has been preserved. Attempts to govern outcomes
are supplanted by “weak invisible hand theorems” stating that outcomes are efficient as long as
workably competitive conditions are maintained.
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Table 1: Policy objectives and instruments in an open market environment
Policy goals Sufficient Necessary
Neither necessary
nor sufficient
Information economy level
Economic growth [Expansive fiscal policy] 1 Monetary policy Competition in ICT
Innovation rate Innovation policy Competition in ICT
Employment growth Workforce training Competition in ICT
ICT use Skill and knowledge
development
Competition in ICT
ICT sector level
Retail price level [All prices set by regulator] Competition in ICT
Universality of service Targeted subsidies Competition in ICT
Broadband access [Targeted subsidies] Competition in ICT
ICT investment level [Direct public investment,
targeted subsidies]
Tax incentives,
competition in ICT
ICT employment [Subsidies] ICT workforce training Competition in ICT
Quality of service [Mandated service quality] Competition in ICT
Protocols, standards [Mandated standards] Voluntary agreements,
international agencies
Consumer protection [Condition regulation] Consumer
protection laws
Micro level
Competitive behavior Open market entry Antitrust oversight
Access to incumbent
network
Open access, inter-connection,
unbundling obligations
Wholesale prices Wholesale price regulation
Quality of service [Quality of service standards]
Investment level [Targeted subsidies] Tax incentives
R&D, innovation [Targeted subsidies] R&D incentives
Notes:  1 Grey font indicates that this instrument is available in principle but not used as it is considered
incompatible with the open market environment.
4.2 Instruments and objectives:
unbundling, competition, and investment
Many of the aforementioned points can be illustrated in more detail using the example of unbun-
dling policy and its links with the policy goals of competition and low prices for telecommunication
services. Although interconnection policies have had an unbundling component since the early twen-
tieth century (Noam 2002), in its recent form it is a product of the 1990s. Unbundling was intro-
duced by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to reduce barriers to entry into local markets. The
original vision was that it would be a transitory phenomenon and facilitate market entry by facili-
ties-based carriers who could build part of their networks and lease others from the incumbent. In
practice most market entry has occurred via unbundled network elements. Contrary to expectations,
according to recent FCC data, of the 11.1 % of total access lines that are provided by new com-
petitors, 21.6 % are based on unbundled loops (“UNE-L”) whereas 66.9 % relied on customized
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packages of loops and switching services (“UNE-P”).8 (FCC 2003). In the European Union local
loop unbundling was mandated as of December 31, 2000 and is widely seen as facilitating new en-
try. Figure 1 presents a simplified diagram of the direct and indirect effects of local loop unbundling
on competition and prices.
? +–
–
?
+
+
–
Un-
bundling
Cost of
entry
Profit
opp.
#
CLECs
ILEC
Profits
Competition
+
+
Price for
fixed voice
service
+ –
Tastes,
habits
Price
mobile
Income Price
VOIP
–
Note: A positive sign indicates that two variables move in the same direction (eg, if income goes up, ceteris
paribus, the price for voice goes up). A negative sign indicates that the two variables move in opposite
directions (eg, if the intensity of competition increases, ceteris paribus the price for voice goes down).
A question mark indicates that the effect could be either positive or negative.
Acronyms: ILEC: incumbent local exchange carrier;
CLECs: competing local exchange carriers;
VOIP: voice over Internet protocol.
Figure 1: Direct and indirect effects of unbundling
Local loop unbundling allows new market entrants to buy network components or even full net-
work platforms from an incumbent service provider. In this sense unbundling reduces the cost of
market entry and ceteris paribus increases the opportunities for profitable market entry. At the same
time it may also have negative incentive effects on network upgrades by the incumbent. The net ef-
fect of unbundling on sector outcomes can therefore only be assessed after these indirect effects are
taken into consideration. Moreover, the effects of unbundling need to be isolated from other factors
that influence market entry and investment decisions. Some may be preconditions for unbundling
to have the desired effects: for example, without open market entry or the presence of potential en-
trants, unbundling will be ineffective. Other factors may influence the strengths of the relation be-
tween unbundling and new entry. For example, the prevailing retail price for voice service, the ex-
isting interconnection regime, and the availability of resale may all play a role. Depending on the
constellation of these other variables, unbundling may have the desired effect, minimal effect, or be
futile. In other words, unbundling might be a necessary and sufficient condition for new market
8 The remaining 11.5 % were resold lines. The share of UNE-P has been increasing steadily from 19.2 % in
June 2000 (FCC 2003, Table 4).
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entry under certain conditions, a necessary but not sufficient condition in other circumstances, or
neither. Even if unbundling is sufficient or necessary for new market entry, it may have only very
indirect impact on policy goals at the sector level, such as the level of investment in advanced in-
frastructure or the prices in the market for voice services. For example, the existing competitive
structure of the voice market, the demand for voice service, and the availability and price of sub-
stitutes and complements will also shape the price charged for voice service.
Due to these counteracting forces, empirical assessments of the net effect of unbundling are critical.
More evidence is desirable but some patterns seem to emerge. Controlling for other exogenous vari-
ables, Gabel and Huang (2003) as well as Prieger (2004) found for the United States that low prices
for unbundled network elements coincide with lower investment into advanced network infrastruc-
ture. On the other hand, in a large cross-national sample, Garcia-Murillo and Gabel (2003) detected
a significant positive impact of unbundling policies on broadband diffusion. In this latter study, the
mixing of nations at very different income levels may have influenced the findings. In any case, the
link between unbundling and these higher level objectives is indirect. A crucial question for policy
makers is whether a lower level policy instrument consistently creates the right incentive with re-
gard to higher level goals. Often, this cannot be determined based on past data. As analytical meth-
ods may not be able to overcome the problem of emergence in complex systems, computational or
simulation methods may be the only practical alternative.
Unbundling also illustrates another aspect of interaction in complex adaptive systems, especially the
political constraints. In the United States, the FCC’s UNE rules as well as its TELRIC method for
pricing were challenged in the courts (see FCC 2003 for an overview of the legal battles) and in the
emerging void state regulatory agencies de facto set UNE prices. The unbundling policies were
thoroughly overhauled in the FCC’s Triennial Review Order in February 2003. Following an earlier
court mandate, this Order adopted a more granular approach to unbundling and gave the states the
task to review the competitive conditions in geographic markets, service markets, and customer
classes to delineate those for which unbundling obligations should remain in force. On March 2, 2004
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned this approach. This decision will again be sub-
ject to a court challenge. Some (e.g., Barbara Cherry of the FCC) have raised concern that the pol-
icy system itself has become chaotic, complicating investment and other business decisions. Although
it will be necessary to develop a metric to assess whether the experience with unbundling is chaotic
in the sense that it is fully unpredictable, this example highlights another use of the complexity view.
4.3 Disruptive technologies:
VoIP, unlicensed wireless and the Internet
The open market environment has enabled a tremendous wave of innovations. Some of the new tech-
nologies pose significant challenges for the established legal and policy framework as well as incum-
bent players. For this reason, they can be termed “disruptive” technologies (in a Schumpeterian sense).
The history of communications is full of technological advances with similar effects and the Internet
is but a recent example of a disruptive technology with broad repercussions for the sector and the
economy at large. In combination with the increasing availability of broadband access networks, the
Internet has created a workable platform for another potentially disruptive technology: VoIP. In the
current framework, VoIP is treated in many countries as information service and thus not subject to
the policy compact governing traditional voice service. In international voice traffic, this has accelerated
the decay of the (anyhow outmoded) system of accounting rates and termination charges. In domestic
voice traffic, VoIP could have far-reaching effects on the existing voice service providers. In the
United States, four areas of potential frictions exist between established policy goals and VoIP: access
charges, universal service funding, emergency services, and law enforcement and national security.
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As information service, VoIP is not subject to the system of access charges governing payments by
long distance service providers (IXCs) to local exchange carriers (LECs). VoIP providers pay
charges for the termination of traffic but they are by an order of magnitude smaller than current ac-
cess charges. Although VoIP challenges the present system of intercarrier compensation, it will
likely facilitate finding a more rational and coherent solution.9 Likewise, VoIP services do not con-
tribute to the universal service fund and threaten to undermine the present system. This system has
its known weaknesses and a more rational, competitively neutral restructuring would be desirable.
However, unlike in the case of intercarrier compensation, it is less clear that this system can be
fixed, given the many opportunities for VoIP providers to evade these contributions. Alternative
means of funding universal service are available and VoIP may just , force a rethinking of such op-
tions, which include general tax funding (unlikely, given the strained public budgets), funding from
spectrum fees, or from levies on telephones.
Wireline (and more recently wireless) voice are furthermore subject to public interest obligations
to facilitate emergency services as well as law enforcement. Service providers need to offer enhanced
emergency calling (E911), which allows the linking of a caller with location and other information
relevant for rescue teams. For example, firefighters are to be provided access to information on the
materials used in a building, medical workers access to pertinent patient information, and so forth.
Wireless service providers fought for several years against these obligations and only reluctantly
and slowly complied. Some VoIP technologies are not easily capable of providing these services.
Some experts argue that the decision to subscribe to emergency services and pay for any additional
cost should rest with the subscriber and not the service provider.10 However this question is solved,
it will have repercussions on the industry. At present voice service providers also have certain ob-
ligations to facilitate law enforcement, for example under the Communications Assistance and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA). Whereas there is widespread agreement that these obligations
should be extended to VoIP, it is not clear how they may eventually be implemented. VoIP raises
other interesting issues. For example, in the United States interconnection obligations exist only be-
tween telecommunications service providers. Some potential VoIP service providers demand that
interconnection privileges be extended to information service providers (NCTA 2004). This may
indeed be an improvement over the status quo ante.
Another example of potentially disruptive technologies are “unlicensed”11 wireless applications,
which include, among others, WiFi, ultrawideband (UWB), cognitive radio applications, or meshed
wireless technologies (Carter, Lahjouli and McNeil 2003). The main challenge posed by these ap-
plications is to incumbent service providers who have paid large sums to gain exclusive access to
electromagnetic spectrum. The prospects, for example, of WiFi as a substitute for these services are
not well understood. Recent developments such as handsets that are WiFi enabled, new antenna de-
signs that extend the reach of WiFi signals up to 50 miles, and a fast growing infrastructure of ac-
cess points, seem to amplify its likely impact. Other solutions, such as ad hoc networks, are not yet
ready to be deployed on a mass scale. It is not clear what kind of applications they may support, al-
though it seems more likely that they will be local. Governance issues in this realm are somewhat
simplified by the fact that, with few exceptions like Guatemala or New Zealand, spectrum is pres-
ently considered a public resource. Thus, government agencies can control the amount of spectrum
allocated to unlicensed services and they can establish rules for the use of these bands. In principle,
19 The FCC is currently conducting a proceeding on intercarrier compensation, with a final Order expected by
July 2004. See Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Developing a Unified Intercarrier
Compensation Regime, CC Docket No. 01-92, April 19, 2001.
10 See remarks by former FCC Chief Economist Michael Katz at the Fifth Quello Communications and Law
Symposium, Washington, D.C., February 25, 2004, Communications Daily, vol. 24, no.38, February 26,
2004, p. 3.
11 The term “unlicensed” is somewhat misleading. Although these services do not require individual licenses,
equipment needs to comply with certain standards.
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this control over the monopolized resource is sufficient to govern the effects of unlicensed services
on the established wireless services (although not to govern services and applications configured in
unlicensed bands). This is not to say this would be a desirable course of action but it illustrates that
controllability increases in the presence of a monopoly resource. Furthermore, given the current
belief in more open and flexible spectrum policy it is unlikely that the government will use this
power.
A third example of a disruptive technology is the Internet itself. Its repercussions have led to a fun-
damental reorientation of information and communication law and regulation in many countries. It
continues to challenge many traditional forms of regulation of communications that enjoy broad
public support, such as the regulation of hate speech or porn. In addition, it raises new issues of
governance in at least five areas (see also Melody 2003). These are engineering and coordination
issues related to the Internet itself; issues related to the infrastructures upon which the Internet rests;
issues related to the services provided via the Internet; issues related to Internet-based applications,
such as electronic signatures; and security issues. One obstacle to finding an acceptable solution is
the sheer number of players and their divergent interests and values. The present Internet govern-
ance regime, predominantly organized around ICANN, is to a large degree vested in its monopoly
control over the root directory of the web (Mueller 2003). Thus, like in the case of wireless services,
control over a crucial resource can, at least in principle, be leveraged in the design of policies. Of
course, this does not necessarily imply that the present policies are efficient or accepted as legiti-
mate. From the theory of complex adaptive systems one can conclude that a grand overall solution
for Internet governance may not be feasible or desirable. Although the “end-to-end” philosophy is
very widely accepted, it is a priori not evident why a certain degree of fragmentation would harm
the Internet overall (Blumenthal and Clark 2001). This is especially the case if gateway technolo-
gies are available that can assure interoperability between different realms of the Internet.12
These examples indicate how the many decentralized decisions in a complex adaptive system can
create significant innovations. They also illustrate the potential challenges to the incumbent service
providers and prevailing policy rules. VoIP, unlicensed wireless and the Internet, while disrupting
the established policy compact, offer an opportunity to rethink important solutions and adjust them
to the world of advanced networks. If anything, these examples illustrate that flexibility with regard
to governance is an absolute necessity in an open system. No grand design can anticipate new and
unexpected developments. An institutional environment that can support piecemeal change and in-
stitutional competition is more likely to successfully cope with these challenges.
4.4 The new policy blueprint: superiority on average
During the past decades, the “old orthodoxy” of monopoly organization has been replaced by a
“new orthodoxy” (Noam 2003) embracing, inter alia, open markets, competition, interconnection,
unbundling, technological neutrality, and competitive neutrality as guiding lights. Overall, the evi-
dence documenting the superiority of the new framework over the old model is decisive. However,
like the old framework, the new consensus also has contributed to a selective perception and thus a
simplistic interpretation of the data. Most of the reports by intergovernmental agencies rely on bi-
variate relations to establish the “success” of competition, independent regulation, or private own-
ership. Yet less is known about these links than is commonly perceived. What can be established is
a correspondence (but not necessarily a simple causal relation) between these policy variables and
12 In practice, as the research of Barabási (2002) demonstrates, the Internet presently does have a strong spatial
structure and is far from the open web it is commonly perceived.
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the performance of the information and communication industries. The availability of empirical data
and more powerful statistical methods, especially to analyze panel data, have contributed to a wave
of empirical cross-national studies. This research has to a large degree corroborated the patterns
identified by less detailed studies but it has also revealed that the relations are often less clear-cut
than commonly assumed.
For example, in a panel study of the effects of privatization and competition on network expansion
and efficiency, Ros (1999) found that in high-income nations private ownership was correlated with
significantly wider diffusion of telephone service, faster growth in the number of access lines per
capita, and higher labor productivity. However, Ros did not find any influence of private ownership in
countries with a gross domestic product per capita below US$ 10,000. Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001)
combined cluster analysis and panel data to examine telecommunications markets in the OECD.
They found that privatization had weakly enhanced efficiency, but that competition had a more de-
cisive influence. In a study of 31 privatized telecommunications firms in 25 countries, Bortolotti,
D’Souza, Fantini and Megginson (2002) observed significant increases in post-privatization per-
formance, and that a significant part of the gains was attributable to regulatory change and the in-
troduction of competition. Wallsten (2001) found for a group of 30 African and South American
nations that competition was the main source of efficiency improvements. Privatization alone yielded
only limited benefits; however, privatization combined with regulation was positively correlated with
better performance. Li and Xu (2002) detected that efficiency improvements were highest when pri-
vatization and competition were combined. Gutierrez and Berg (2000), Levy and Spiller (1996) and
Henisz (2002) emphasize the importance of regulatory commitment and a stable institutional frame-
work for investment as preconditions for good performance. The general tenor emerging from these
studies is that the configuration of property rights, competition and regulation is crucial but that
multiple arrangements may yield satisfactory outcomes.
Moreover, the data shows that the new policy blueprint works “on average”, which may be of help
but not fully solve the decision-making problem of a policy-maker in a specific location, time, and
context. Our discussion of complex adaptive systems demonstrated at a conceptual level that policy
objectives at a sector and economy-wide level may, in fact, be achievable by different sets of pol-
icy instruments. Thus, there may not be just one “best” solution to governing the information and
communication industries and different mixes of governing institutions and instruments may yield
comparable outcomes.13 This outcome is compatible with a large body of comparative research
(Ragin 1987, 2000). These studies indicate that it is often impossible to identify a single sufficient
condition for an outcome but that several groups (“constellations”) of policy instruments may be
able to realize them. Thus, fast broadband diffusion can be the outcome of concerted government
efforts, the product of competition policy, related to user habits, or a combination of these factors.14
This does, of course, not throw overboard the need for sound policy frameworks. For example, pol-
icy and regulation are instrumental in creating an environment conducive to private sector invest-
ment. However, it does broaden the perspective to the fact that in complex adaptive systems like the
present information and communications sector more policy options may exist than are currently
utilized.
13 This raises a much broader issue, which cannot be discussed here in detail: markets do not exist in the ab-
stract. As Samuels (2002, p. 89) points out “markets are a function of the institutions which help form them
and work through them.” Therefore “differently structured markets organize knowledge and determine which/
whose interests count in different ways” (ibid.). Therefore, there is no unique Pareto optimal solution (see
also the contributions by Sen, 2002). Whereas this is a fundamental debate, it is currently not conducted in
an explicit way in ICT policy-making.
14 Noam (2002) makes a similar point with regard to wireless services, which achieved significant growth even
in countries with poor policy frameworks.
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Such alternatives to the status quo will need to be explored and tested in practice. Just as competi-
tion is a discovery procedure, different legal and institutional arrangements are discovery procedures
at a higher level of social organization. In the light of this argument and contrary to prevailing wis-
dom, agreements aiming at the simplification of policies across nations should not strive for full
homogenization but preserve a degree of experimentation and diversity that can facilitate institu-
tional learning. Where possible, policy-makers may in fact be well advised to allow competition
between different policy regimes. Examples of competing legal, regulatory and technological regimes
exist in today’s information and communications industries and advance knowledge about govern-
ance. The coexistence of the Internet as an open end-to-end platform with other networks facilitated
understanding of the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. Likewise, in the
wireless sector, the coexistence of exclusive and shared (unlicensed) bands allows overcoming the
problems of incomplete information by allowing the accumulation of experience. Whereas such in-
stitutional diversity may, at any point in time, not be the most efficient solution, it nevertheless cre-
ates dynamic benefits.15 One important task for policy will therefore be to protect rather than reduce
institutional diversity.
A last insight deserves brief mentioning. Levy and Spiller (1996) have pointed out that the optimal
degree of complexity of rules depends on the institutional endowment of a nation or region. This is
compatible with the view that dynamic adaptive systems work best in a zone between too much or-
der and stability on the one hand and chaos on the other. The optimal mix may be dependent on the
problem at hand although it may not be fully under the control of policy-makers. As a result, na-
tions or regions may periodically “luck-out” although the “luck” may shift over time. At a high level,
this is illustrated in a comparison between the U.S. and EU in their respective transitions since the
1990s. It seems that the EU’s more centralized policy framework, which gave the Council and the
Commission great leverage at a time when national regulatory agencies (NRAs) were not yet fully
established, facilitated the creation of a more integrated policy space. Moreover, once the initial re-
sistance to transformation was overcome, as owners of the incumbent service provider, the ability
of governments to design and implement policy was much greater than the ability of the U.S. policy-
makers, which are embedded in a much more complicated and multi-layered policy framework.
Aggregate performance data reveal dramatically that, on average, the EU was trailing the U.S. in
the early 1990s but that by the beginning of the next decade it had reversed that picture in key indi-
cators, such as the prices paid for services, penetration of mobile services, and in many countries
broadband access. As the number of stakeholders multiplies in the EU and NRAs become more
entrenched, the EU’s regulatory framework may begin to resemble that of the U.S., unless meas-
ures are undertaken to reestablish some more centralized form of control.16 This brief example illus-
trates that regulatory institutions are both emerging and created but not fully controlled by policy.
15 Competition, like its biological sibling evolution, is a wasteful process, as so vividly expressed by Joseph
A. Schumpeter in his metaphor of the “gales of creative destruction.”
16 A case in point may be the UMTS spectrum licensing approach, as mentioned above.
22 _____________________________________________________________________ Johannes M. Bauer
manu:script (ITA-04-03) _________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
5 Preliminary lessons and conclusions
This paper raised the question of whether in the present more diverse and technologically dynamic
environment, information and communication policy could successfully control and manage the per-
formance of this crucial infrastructure. Contrary to the growing view that advanced information in-
frastructures cannot be successfully governed (and therefore should not be governed), the paper
finds that governance is possible and makes a difference. However, in the emerging environment,
problems of incomplete information, institutional feasibility conditions, and the increasing com-
plexity of the sector alter the conditions of governance. In a complex adaptive system, it is more
difficult to find sufficient instruments for policy objectives, especially at the sector and economy
level. This has been aggravated by voluntary restraint to not utilize certain policy instruments. Some
of these instruments, such as control via public ownership rights, are known to have serious limita-
tions. Nevertheless, there may be scenarios under which they work reasonably well.17 While this pa-
per certainly does not advocate a return to the past, it suggests a renewed pragmatic look at a broader
range of policy instruments. Having said this, and with the caveat that substantial additional research
will be necessary, some general insights emerge (see also the overview of Brock and Colander 2000
on policy implications of complexity theory in general):
• Given information constraints, political feasibility constraints, and complexity, grand policy de-
signs aimed at controlling the overall evolution of this infrastructure carry significant risks (as
exemplified by the European UMTS experience) as opposed to more gradual policies. In this
sense, seen from a complexity perspective policy needs to become more humble, seeking for lo-
cal improvements.
• It is easier to specify sufficient policy instruments at the micro level. However, these instruments
are only indirectly linked with important policy objectives at the sector and economy level. Ab-
sent renewed interest in sector and macroeconomic governance, performance at these levels will
be an emergent property, not fully controlled by policy instruments at the micro level.
• Where feasible, policy can support mechanisms of self-organization, most importantly competi-
tion. The stability of the information and communication sector will to a certain degree depend
on policies that keep forms of destructive competition at an acceptable level. To this end, in ad-
dition to antitrust oversight, some regulatory inertia and friction may be desirable.
• From a systems perspective, it becomes apparent that information and communication technolo-
gies do not move toward a preordained equilibrium state (as assumed in most of modern regu-
latory economics). This implies that traditional regulatory theory may only be a good guide for
static or dynamic steady state situations, but not for other problems. However, the normative
foundations of more dynamic models are not developed yet.
• Using tools from the analysis of complex systems, more attention would be paid to nonlinear de-
velopments and events that might shift a predictable system into a chaotic region. Thus, rather
than looking for efficiency-enhancing means the focus of attention would shift to stability-en-
hancing measures. Some inertia and friction in the governance framework of the sector may be
desirable.
• Seen from the view of complex adaptive systems, policy recommendations are less certain as
multiple indirect effects and time lags may complicate the calibration of measures. In many situa-
tions no policies may exist that can actually improve things. Attempts at fine-tuning governance
are replaced by adherence to transparent rule-based regimes that facilitate stability and private
contracts (Longstaff 2003).
17 Public and cooperative ownership is experiencing renewed interest in the United States in the context of
broadband networks although no systematic assessment has been conducted.
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• Complexity analysis sharpens the view of effects that may not show up immediately but involved
slow feedback processes as well as indirect effects. Particular attention may be paid to abrupt
changes in the stability of a system.
• It is recognized that in social systems regularities and patters may change. Therefore, the effects
of policies may change as well. Broader use of comparative methods and scenario thinking may
help explore these issues.
• Complexity theory also would require an application of different methods to explore policy op-
tions. For example, it would continuously review policy outcomes based on empirical data and
would more widely rely on computational and experimental methods.
• Overall, these insights would be more applicable to aggregate levels, that is, policies at the sec-
toral and economy-wide level. Nevertheless, micro-level policies would be reviewed using a richer
set of questions and tools.
In practice, ICT regulators have adopted some of these proposals already. For example, in the
United States computational analysis is slowly introduced into policy analysis at the FCC. Policy-
makers in Europe and the United States have made an effort to monitor the experience with regu-
latory change, although the methods are in an early stage of development. Overall, the insights re-
viewed in this paper complement present tools and analytical methods. Governance matters but in
ways that are more complicated that previously assumed. While this view to a certain degree weak-
ens the trust in the established set of practical policy knowledge, it also may open a road to a deeper
understanding of the prospects and limits of policy in this vital industry.
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